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OPTIMAL DYNAMIC TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO FIRMS
Raymond GRADUS
Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153 5000 LE TiZburg, The Netherlands
In this paper we develop a framework for determining optimal profit taxa-
tion in a market economy with value-maximising firms, which face costs of
adjustment for investment. The government chooses this tax rate in such a
way that the utility of the consumer, which depends on public and private
consumption will be maximised. The private consumption is financed by wage
income, while public consumption is financed by tax revenues. We show that
there is a dynamic trade-off between public consumption now and in the
future. Two possible solutions are derived. The first solution, which is
the formal outcome of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of a game be-
tween government and firms, is time-inconsistent and is only credible, if
there is commitment or if there are reputational forces. The second solu-
tion, which corresponds to a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, is time-
consistent, but yields a lower value of steady-state utility.
1. Introduct3on
In this paper we focus on the problem of the trade-off between invest-
ment behaviour of the firm and the tax policy of a'rational' government.
The government may announce a relatively low corporate tax rate and be-
cause of that a lower level of public consumption than wanted by
consumers. But this relatively low tax rate also implies a higher level of
investment, which generates a higher level of total consumption in the
future. In this paper we model this dynamic trade-off between corporation
taxation now and in the future within a macro-economic framework. We are
concerned with two possible solutions. However, which solutions happens,
depends on the credibility and reputation of the government. The first
solution is time-inconsistent, i.e. becomes suboptimal for the government
over time and is only credible, if the firm is expected to believe so. The
second solution is time-consistent and results, if the firm expects ra-
tional behaviour of the government at all times, but yields a lower value
of steady-state utility.
The question of optimal taxation is a very broad one and many strands
of literature can be identified (see for example Ramsey (1927), Sandmo2
(1976), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Laffer (1981)). The first distinc-
tion can be made between papers, which deal with this problem in a static
way (e.g. Ramsey (192~) and Laffer (1980)) and in a dynamic way (e.g.
Kydland and Prescott (1980), Turnovsky and Brock (1980)). In this paper we
deal with the problem of optimal dynamic taxation. We can also distinguish
between different kinds of tax rates, e.g. sales tax, wage or income tax
and profit tax. Most interest in the literature has been paid to the
problem of optimal static income tax, because of their impact on the sup-
ply and demand for labour (e.g. Laffer (1981)). Relatively líttle interest
has been paid to the problem above. An example can be found in Fischer
(1980), in which a two period problem is treated. However, there is no
separation between the decision of the firm and the consumer. We believe,
that profit taxation has a greater impact on the outcome of the economic
process, because its impact on the capital accumulation and the investment
decision, than the place in the literature suggests. In this paper we
treat the problem of optimal profit taxation.
The problem of profit taxation can be analysed from a different num-
ber of perspectives. First, it can be analysed from the viewpoint of
government revenue maximisation (e.g. Gradus (1988a, 1988b)), secondly
profit taxation can be used as an instrument for employment policy (e.g.
Gradus (1988c)). However as mentioned above, in this paper we choose as
objective maximisation of an intertemporal utility function, which depends
on private and public consumption.
With respect to the behavioural assumptions we develop a game-
theoretic framework. Firms and consumers take the decisions of the others
as given, but the government takes into account the way in which the
agents will take their decisions. So, the solution corresponds to a
Stackelberg game with the government as leader and the firms and the con-
sumers playing Nash against each other (see Basar and Olsder (1982,
chapter ~)). Attention is paid to the problems of time-inconsistency,
reputation and credibility, which arise by using this framework. For
reasons of analytical tractability we assume that there is only one type
of consumer and one type of firm.
In section 2 we describe the model for the firm, which is based on
neo-classical theory (e.g. Lucas (196~)), while in section 3 the model for3
the government and consumers is given. In section 4 we compare the open-
loop and feedback solutions by applying a numerical example. Special
attention is paid to the problem of time-inconsistency. In section 5 we
extend the model by incorporating a dynamic wealth constraint for the con-
sumer (e.g. Abel and Blanchard (i983) and Van de Klundert and Peters
(1986)), so that there is a solid description of saving behaviour by
agents and of investment behaviour by firms. Section 6 concludes and gives
some suggestions for future research.
2. The firm's decision problem
Consider a firm operating in an environment without exogenous
uncertainty. The firm decides on its demand for labour and investment,
which are conditional on its expectations, present and future profit tax
rates, present and future interest rates. The firm maximises its dis-
counted stream of net profits (see Van der Ploeg (1987))
t
-fr(v)dv
max f ((f(k(t),1(t))-wl(t))(1-T(t))-i(t)-~(i(t)))e 0 dt, (1)
i,l 0
where: k: the level of the capital stock,
1: the number of employed workers,
i: the rate of investment,
w: the real wage rate (-constant),
K: the level of corporate tax rate,
r: the rate of interest,
f(k,l): production function,
~p(i): internal adjustment costs,
, ~~
p(0)-0, sign(p )-sign(i), ~ ~0.
With respect to the production function we assume that capital and labour
are substitutes and production is characterised by constant returns to
scale ( so that fllf~ - fkl - 0). The planning horizon is infinite. The4
strictly convex function p(.) captures that internal adjustment costs in-
crease and are zero only if gross investment is zero. It ensures that
capital adjusts in a sluggish manner to changes in interest rate and cor-
porate tax rate. The firm will maximise (1) subject to the capital
accumulation equation
k(t) - i(t) - ók(t),
where: b: rate of depreciation.




q(t)- (r(t)}S)9(t)- fk(1-T(t)), lim e t q(s)k(s) - 0. (3)
s~
p (i(t)) - q(t)- 1,
fl - w.
k(t) - i(t) - ák(t),




If we assume that f(k,l) is a Cobb-Douglas production function and that
wages are constant, then labour is a linear function of capital and the
partial derivative with respect to capital is a constant. So (3)-(6) can
be rewritten as follows:
q - (r4b)q - a(1-Z),





k - i - bk, (10)
where a and h are positive constants.5
With respect to fixed wages we can assume that there is some union power,
that ensures wages to be equal to some fixed level w(e.g. Oswald (1985)).
It is also possible to model a labour market, where w is determined by
supply and demand for labour (e.g. Abel and Blanchard (1983)). In that
case there can be full employment.
The steady-state investment level is just sufficient to provide for
N M
depreciation, i Lbk , so that the ahadow price of capital exceeds one,
M , r
q-1t9~ (Sk ). This means, that the shadow price of a unit of capital
equals the costs of purchasing investment goods plus the marginal costs of
adjusting the capital stock. The steady-state capital follows from (~)-
(10) and can be expressed as
w
k~- ~(artbT ), kT(0, kr~0.
So if the corporate tax rate raises, capital formation decreases and there
will be less employment.
3. The government's decision problem
The government maximises a concave utility function, which depends on
private and public consumption. We assume that the government has the same
utility function as the consumer (e.g. T~rnovsky and Brock (1980)), that
public consumption will be financed from profit taxation and that there is
no debt. As already noted in section 1, an important difference between
government and firm is that the government takes account of the manner in
which the firms reacts on its taxation decisions, while the firm takes the
corporate tax rate as given.
In this section we assume an arbitrary simple model for the consumer.
It consumes all its earnings and equilibrium personal savings will be zero
at every point in time. So the firm finances investment by retained
earnings. In section 5 we will relax this assumption. However, in this
section we want to focus on the government's taxation problem.6
Given a sequence of interest rates {r(t)}t-~0.~) the problem for the
government and the consumer can be conveniently formulated as the control
problem:
m -pt
max f u(c(t),g(t))e dt ,
T 0
(12)
subject to: q(t) - (r(t)tb)q(t) - a(1-T(t)), (13)
c(t) - (1-T(t))(f(k(t),1(t))-wl(t))-i(t)-~(i(t))twl(t), (14)
g(t) - T(t)(f(k(t),1(t))-wl(t)), (15)
k(t) - ~(q(t)) - ák(t), (16)
where: p: social discount rate,
c: private consumption,
g: public consumption.
Note that equation (15) stands for the fact, that there is no debt, be-
cause at every time-point government's spendings, i.e. g(t), are equel to
the revenue from taxation.
Furthermore, we assume that there are Cobb-Douglas preferences and
that labour is a linear function of capital:
u(c(t),g(t)) - alnc(t) t (1-a)ing(t), O(a~l, (17)
c(t) - (1-T(t))ak(t)t whk(t)- ~(q(t))- ~(~(q(t))), (18)
g(t) - T(t)ak(t). (19)
The maximisation of (12) with respect to (13)-(19) yields, by assuming an
interior solution, the following necessary conditions:
a ~c 1-a ~g
C~c7T 4 g~~T - va - O,
v(t) - pv(t) - (r(t)tb)v(t) - ~(t)~ (q(t))
- c~t){~a1~~(q(t))~}1} ~~(q(t)), v(0)-0,
(20)
(21)a(t) - (Stb)~(t) - a[(1-T(t))atwh]~c(t) - (1-a)~k(t).
lim e-Sta(t)k(t) - 0,
t~
(22)
where: a: the government's undiscounted marginal value of capital stock,
v: the government's undiscounted marginal value of the shadow price
of the capital stock to the firm (-q).
Given equation (18), (19) and (20) we can derive:
T- T(k,v,q), Tk)0, Tq(0, Tv)0. (23)
It should be noted, that the optimal tax rate will be chosen in such a
direction, that the following equations holds, along the equilibrium path:
pi(~ - 1-a y(t)g(t)
c(t) a (1 4 ( 1-a)k(t))' (24)
The steady-state follows from eqs. (21) and (22) and can be expressed as:
N r N N r N r N 1)
vN: - ~ ~ (q )t(o~~c ){9~ (~(q ))fl}~ (q ) ~ 0
N
r .b-g
M N N r
~ - {a[(1-T )afwh]~c 4 (1-a)~k }~(pfb) ) 0.
(25)
(26)
So in the steady-state the amount of public consumption in total consump-
tion is less than 1-a (cf. (24), (25)). With equation (il), (18), (25) and
(26) the optimal tax rate in the steady-state can be derived:
N M M
T - T(k ,v ,q ). (27)
4. About time-inconsistency of optimal plans8
In section 3 we have described an optimal profit taxation plan for the
government. However, this optimal plan is time-inconsistent (e.g. Kydland
and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978)), because there is an incentive for the
government to reoptimize and reconsider its tax strategy at some later
date. Once the capital is installed, the government has an incentive to
renege on its announcement and ask a higher tax rate. Note, that the mar-
ginal value to the government of the firm's ahadow price muat equel zero
at the start of the planning period, because the firm's shadow price is
free to jump at that point of time and therefore becomes effectively an
additional policy instrument for the government. So, if the government has
the possibility at some later point of time to make a new initial plan,
this shadowprice becomes zero again. However, one of the basics of open-
loop information structure (e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982)) is that the
players stick to their announced plan. So if the firm has no reason to
believe that the government will stick to its initial plan, the concept
used in section 3, which corresponds to a open-loop equilibrium of a
Stackelberg game, is no longer a useful concept. In this case the
feedback-Stackelberg concept can be used.
Because of the state-separability the open-loop Nash equilibrium is
also a candidate for the feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium (e.g.
Dockner et al. (1985)), where the Nash equilibrium effectively sets
{v(t)-0, vt ) 0} and ignorea (19). This equilibrium is time-consistent,
because time-consistency implies {v(t)-0, dt ~ 0} (e.g. Pohjola (1986)).
The open-loop Nash solution is easy to calculate and it turns out that the
optimal tax rate is given by
T - T(k,0,4), Tk)0, Tq(0. (28)
Along the equilibrium path the following equation holds: ~- láa. So,
given e certain level of capital, the tax rate in the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium is higher than in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. From
equations (7)-(10) it follows that the marginal productivity and the
w
shadow price of capital, i. e. q, is lower in the feedback Stackelberg
solution. Hence, less capital is accumulated and unemployment is higher.9
In this regime there is a reduction in utility for the government and a
reduction in the stream of cash-flow for the firm compared with the open-
loop Stackelberg solution (see table 1).
The shadow price v can be interpreted as a price of time-
inconsistency. At a later point of time, if capital is installed, there is
an incentive for the government to ask a higher tax rate, such that ff-
1-a
.I.he extra a gain of increasing the tax rate, such that q increases by
1, is equal t0 -v. SO, -v equals the marginal value of cheating the firm
by suddingly raising the tax rate. In this way -v can be interpreted as
the government's cost for sticking to its announced plan.
Table 1
A comparison of the open-loop and the feedback solutlon
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So for both players it is better that open-loop is played, but at the
moment that the capital stock is build up, there is an incentive for the
government to reoptimise and ask a higher tax rate. The outcome for the
firm is of course lower, if the government cheats the firm by suddenly as-10
king the high rate in stead of sticking to its announced plan. So a time-
inconsistent plan requires binding commitments to force the government to
stick to its announced tax strategy. However, i t should be noted, that
reputational forces can also be important to prevent the government from
cheating (e.g. Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example, which is based on the following three assumptions:
(i) quadratic adjustment costs: ~(i)-bi2,
(ii) Cobb-Douglas production function: f(k,l)-ka11-a, OCa~l,
(iii) lim rt-p,
t-~









































f(k ,1 )- 0.7746
) ur- 0.3810
In the steady-state the following optimal tax rule can be derived:
Tfbs- 1 - b 1-a
( 2(rtb))a




Tols, is found by e numerical procedure.
This example makes clear the difference between the open-loop and the
feedback solution. The feedback solution yields a higher value of steady-
state tax rate and because of that a lower level of capital stock than the
open-loop solution (see table 2). This lower level of capital stock in the
feedback case yields a lower level of steady-state utility. In the open-
loop case the share of public consumption goods in total output ia lower,
but private consumption and total utility will be higher because there is
more capital. However, this open-loop solution is time-inconsistent and is
only reasonable if there is commitment or there are reputational forces.
5. A dynamic wealth constraint for the consumer
So far, the analysis has assumed an arbitrary model for the consumer,
because of the fact that the consumer consumes all its earnings. In this
section we will model the saving-investment decision, such as Abel and
Blanchard (1983) for example. The consumer can choose between consumption
now or in the future. In this way consumption is an increasing function of
total wealth in the spirit of Metzler (1951) and an equilibrium between
aggregate demand and supply is also now achieved by the endogeneous ad-
justment of the sequence of current and future interest rates.
In this section we present the model for the consumer. After that we
make some remarks regarding the behaviour of the firm, which is under some
additional assumptions the same as in section 2. Finally we describe the
behaviour of the government, which becomes quite complicated now. With
respect to the behavioural assumptions the consumer and the firm take the
decision of the other as given, while the government takes into account
the way the firm and consumer make their decisions. So the formal outcome
of the game corresponds to a three person Stackelberg game with the
government as leader and firm and consumer playing Nash against each
other.
The consumer choose a sequence of consumption, which maximises the
present value of utility12
m -pt
max f u(c(t),g(t))e dt.
c(t) 0
The wealth constraint can be expressed as
b(t) - r(t)b(t) t n(t) t wl(t) - c(t),
where: b: amount of bonds hold by consumer,
rr: dividends,
j: total investment expenditures (it~(i)).
(30)
(31)
So income is the sum of wages, interest on savings and dividends. The op-
timality conditions are:
~u(c(t),g(t)) - x(t), ~c(t)




in which: x(t): the costate variable associated with the dynamic budget
constraint.
The underlying finance structure in section 2 was that the firm
finances investment by retained earnings and never issues new shares or
bonds. In this section the firm finances investment by retained earnings
or by issuing shares or bonds. However, because of the fact that the in-
terest rate on bonds is also r and the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds,
all financing schemes are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the
same path of total consumption and investment; they differ, however, in
terms of institutional arrangements (for a proof of this see Abel and
Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681)). Note that we still assume that the govern-
ment has a zero deficit.
The problem for the government can be formulated as the following con-
trol problem:13
m -pt
max f u(c(t),g(t))e dt,
T o
subject to: q(t) - (r(t)tb)q(t) - a(1-T(t)),
uc - x.
g(t) - T(t)ak(t),
k(t) - ~(q(t)) - bk(t),
x(t) - (p-r(t))x(t),
b(t) - r{t)b(t) t n{t) r wl(t)-c(t).
If there are Cobb-Douglas prefences this leads to the following
Hamiltonian with the necessary conditions:
H- alna - x(t)lna t(1-oc)ln(aT(t)k(t)) 4~(t)(~(q(t))-bk(t))










v(t) - gv(t) - (r(t)tb)v(t)- ~(t)~~(q(t))
c(t)
a
(42) {9~ (~(9(t)))tl}~ (q(t)). v(C)-C,
y(t) - (p-r(t))y(t), lim e-~ty(t)b(t) - 0, (43)
t-~
~,(t) - lna - r(t)b(t) - rt(t) - whk((t) 4 a~x(t) t r(t)~,(t),
n(0)~0, (44)
~(t) -(~fs)~(t) - i-a -(~rt t
fwh)Y(t). lime-~t~(t)k(t) - 0 . (45) k(t) ~k(t) t-~
T(t) - Y(t)~T(t) } v(t?a - 0. (46)
From equation (46) the optimal tax rate can be derived. Note that the op-
timal corporate tax rate depends on the financing scheme of the firm and14
x(t)-y(t). If we have, for example, the financing scheme of section 2,
which says that investment is financed by retained earnings:
n(t) - (1-t(t))ak(t) - 3(t). ~T - -~~,
than equation ( 4~) becomes:
g~~ - 1-a y(t)g(t)
c(t) a (1 4 ( 1-a)k(t))'
(4~)
(48)
A different financing scheme is, that firms finances replacement invest-
ment by retained earnings and net investment by bonds. In that case (4~)
and (48) become:
rt(t) - (1-z(t))ak(t)-ák(t)-9~(bk(t))-r(t)b(t), ~T - -jt. (49)
gS~ - 1-a y(t)g(t)
c(t) a (1 } (1-a)k(t))' (50)
Now also equation (24), which says that the share of government's consump-
tion in total output is less than 1-a, holds at every time-point. There is
only one reason, for the fact that equation (24), even in a model with a
dynamic budget constraint, no longer holds and that is that the way that
the firms finances their investment depends on the level of corporate
taxation. Together with the condition for the equilibrium in the goods
market:
f(k(t).1(t)) - c(t) t B(t) t i(t) t~(i(t)) (51)
we have total macro-economic model, which ís repeated in the appendix.
Themodel has 14 equations and 14 unknown variables and can be solved by
the method of multiple shooting as explained in Lipton et al. (1982). Note
that the condition for the equilibrium in the goods market, together with
the anticipation that this condition will hold at future times, determines
at any instant the complete term structure of interest rates.15
In the steady-state, where the rate of interest equals the social dis-
count rate and personal savings are zero, we have the same tax rate as in
the case without the dynamic budget constraint. So from this point of view
we can draw the conclusion that the main features mentioned in section 4
still remain. Although the adjustment process in the case of personal
savings differs, the long run results are the same.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a macro-economic dynamic model with
value-maximising firms, infinitely utility-optimising long-lived consumers
and a government, which tries to choose its tax instrument in such a
direction that the utility of the consumer is maximised. The formal struc-
ture of the interaction between government and firms or consumers
corresponds to s open-loop Stackelberg game with the government as leader.
By doing this we are concerned with the problem of optimal taxation over
time. However, the introduction of optimising government in our framework
induces that its optimal plan is intertemporally time-inconsistent. So, if
there is no reason to believe that the government will stick to its an-
nounced plan, this open-loop concept is no longer useful. In that case the
solution can correspond to the equilibrium of a feedback Stackelberg game,
which is by definition time-consistent. However, this solution yields a
lower value of steady-state utility. In this respect it should be men-
tioned that if the announced policy ia credible, because there is
commitment or there are reputational forces, the time-inconsistent policy
can be chosen and there is a Pareto improvement of steady-state utility.
So the credibilty of the government's policy can play an important role in
the effectivity of its policy (see also Gradus (1988 b,c)). In this paper
we deal with the two possible solutions mentioned above and present an ex-
ample, which shows the importance of agreement and consistency in economic
theory.
In future work, there are many avenues to explore. Firstly, other tax
instruments, like wage or sales tax, can be analysed. Secondly, we can
analyse what will happen under the assumption of perfect competition in
the labour market. Thirdly, a thorough analysis of reputational equilibria16
is required ( e.g. Kreps and Wilson (1982)). Fourthly, it is important to
perform an empirical investigation to establisch in 'which' regime the
economy has been at various times. For a first and interesting attempt see
Weber (1988). Finally, the framework can be used to characterize the
dynamic effects of shocka or policies.
1) assuming that rtá-~)0, which is quite reasonable
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Appendix: The total macro-economic uadel
Given the financing scheme that the flrm finances replacement investment
by retained earnings and net investment by issuing new bonds.
s
-fr(v)dv
q: 9-(rtb)q-a(1-T).lim e t q(s)k(s) - 0.
s~
c: xc - a,




k: k - ~(q)-bk, k(0)-k0, (A.4)
x: x - (S-r)x, t~e-Stx(t)b(t) - 0, (A.5)
b: b ~ it~(i)-bk-~(bk), b(0)-b0, (A.6)
v: v - ~v - (r.b)v-a~'(9)- ~{~'(~(9)tl)}~~(q). v(0)-0. (A.7)
n: n - rntlna-i-~(i)tbkt~(bk), n(0)-0, (A.8)
a: ~-(~tb)~-lka-(a(1-~)twh)x, t~e-sta(t)k(t) ~ 0. (A.9)
i: i-~(q), (A1.10)
g: B - láa(1}k( -~). (A1.11)
1: 1 - hk, (A1.12)
r: f(k,l) - ctg}it~(i). (A1.13)
rt: n - (f(k,l)-wl)(1-T)-bk-~(bk)-rb. (A1.14)i
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